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Constitutional Courts and &LWL]HQV¶Perceptions of Judicial Systems in Europe 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In recent decades constitutional courts have become essential institutions in the political 
systems of many European countries. At the legal level, constitutional courts are designed 
as organs intended to protect and enforce the normative constitution. At the political level, 
they are also expected to play a role in the protection of democratic systems of 
government and human rights. However, the stability of a democracy does not only 
depend on efficient institutional designs, but also on acceptable levels of public support 
for democratic institutions. Using data from the European Social Survey, this article 
shows that constitutional courts have negative effects on public views of the court system 
in at least two dimensions: perceptions of judicial independence and perceptions of 
judicial fairness. These effects, however, decrease with the age of the democratic system. 
Given the core role that diffuse support for the judiciary plays in the stability of the rule 
of law in a country, our findings suggest that, paradoxically, constitutional courts might 
have detrimental effects to the very goal that justifies their existence: the protection of 
democratic systems of government. 
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I. Introduction 
 
 
Post-war European political systems have witnessed the consolidation of an important 
constitutional innovation: constitutional courts. Although the first constitutional court 
was created in Austria in 1920, it is only after World War II when these institutions spread 
and consolidated on the continent (see Harding et al., 2009: 13; Ferreres Comella, 2009: 
3-4). This development shows the political importance that judicial-type organs have 
acquired in contemporary democracies, insofar as constitutional courts are one of the most 
far-reaching attempts to protect and reinforce liberal systems of government through 
institutional innovation in the last decades.  
 
Constitutional courts are judicial-type organs that monopolize the power in a jurisdiction 
to declare legislation unconstitutional (see Ginsburg and Versteeg, 2014: 591; Stone 
Sweet, 2002a: 79 ff.). They are modelled on the theories developed by the jurist Hans 
Kelsen in the early 20th century, although their current designs often diverge from the 
original Kelsenian model in important regards (Ferejohn, 2002: 51ff; Stone Sweet, 2002a: 
81-82). According to Stone Sweet (2002a: 78), Kelsenian constitutional courts were a 
response to the quHVWLRQ RI µhow to guarantee the normative superiority of the 
constitution, and of human rights provisions, wLWKRXWHPSRZHULQJWKHMXGLFLDU\¶. 
 
Currently, constitutional courts usually perform three main functions. First, they can 
declare legislation unconstitutional, thus protecting the normative constitution which is 
generally deemed as the foundation of the democratic political system. Second, they 
receive constitutional complaints by citizens, becoming the ultimate protection of 
constitutional rights. Third, they act as arbiters between the different levels and organs of 
government, policing the division of powers and, in decentralized systems, federal 
arrangements. Against this background, it is easy to understand the importance of these 
institutions for the political systems in which they are implemented: since in these systems 
the normative constitution includes the basic rules and institutions of democracy, as well 
as catalogues of fundamental rights, the enforcement of constitutional provisions is 
deemed essential for the protection of political freedom. Constitutional courts were 
designed as the mechanism that would guarantee such enforcement: they act, in other 
words, as the guardians of the constitution.  
 
Constitutional courts can thus be considered as an institutional innovation aimed at 
protecting democratic systems. However, the survival of democracies not only depends 
on efficient institutional designs, but also on a healthy amount of public support for and 
confidence in key elements of the system. The judiciary is one of those key elements. As 
Bühlmann and Kunz (2011: 318) put it, µVXSSRUWIRU WKHUXOHRIODZLVSULPRUGLDO WRD
democracy and support for the judicial system is essential for the operation of the rule of 
ODZ¶ VHH DOVR $\GÕQ dDNÕU DQG ùHNHUFLR÷OX  . At the institutional level, 
constitutional courts are expected to produce more stable democracies, with stronger and 
more sophisticated systems of check and balances and a more effective protection for 
fundamental rights. However, their effect on the second element of the equation, public 
confidence in the judicial system, remains largely unexplored. What is the impact of 
constitutional courts on public perception of judiciaries? What iVWKHLULPSDFWRQFLWL]HQV¶
perceptions of the independence and fairness of the judicial systems?  Although research 
in the field has made important contributions to the understanding of the factors that 
   
 
   
 
explain public perceptions of the judiciary and of specific courts (inter alia, Mondak and 
Ishiyama, 1997; Gibson et al., 1998; Gibson, 2007; Bühlmann and Kunz, 2011; $\GÕQ
dDNÕUDQGùHNHUFLR÷OXGonzález-Ocantos, 2016), we still lack evidence about the 
effect on such perceptions of these particular institutions, constitutional courts.  
 
This article aims at filling this gap and at shedding light on this important question, being 
to the best of our knowledge the first piece of research addressing this issue. Our 
expectation is indeed that the presence of a constitutional court in a country is associated 
with more negative public perceptions of the court system. The reason is twofold. First, 
DV VDLG E\ )HUUHUHV &RPHOOD  µGHVSLWH WKHLU LPSRUWDQW GLIIHUHQFHV LQ VHYHUDO
respecWV RUGLQDU\ FRXUWV DQG VSHFLDO FRQVWLWXWLRQDO WULEXQDOV DUH ERWK ³FRXUWV´¶ ZKLFK
MXVWLI\ WKHLUGHFLVLRQV µE\ UHIHUHQFH WR D VHW RI OHJDO QRUPV WKDW WKH\ DUH LQ FKDUJHRI
LQWHUSUHWLQJDQGHQIRUFLQJ¶ Thus, while they are sometimes separated from the judicial 
branch, before the eyes of most citizens constitutional courts are simply courts, albeit very 
important ones. For this reason, public perceptions about the functioning of the 
constitutional court affect perceptions of the court system in general. Second, aspects of 
the institutional design of constitutional courts, such as the political appointment of 
constitutional judges and their capacity to strike down legislation erga omnes and in 
abstracto at the request of political actors, leads to a perception of politicization of these 
organs. This, in turn, increases the perception of unfairness of their decisions, because 
judicial decision-making is deemed to be motivated by political rather than legal criteria, 
and because in deciding on constitutional controversies constitutional courts create 
political winners and losers, alienating part of the public. 
 
To test our theory, this article runs a number of mixed-effects models, using data from 
the 5th round of the European Social Survey (ESS, 2010). Our findings are not good news 
for constitutional courts. Indeed, we consider that such findings constitute an important 
evidence-based disruption of usual conceptualizations of the role of these institutions in 
democratic systems of government. As expected, the presence of a constitutional court in 
a country is associated with worse public perceptions of the judiciary in the two 
aforementioned dimensions: perception of politicization and perception of fairness of the 
justice system. These findings suggest that constitutional courts might have unintended 
negative consequences that are counter-productive to the very aims that justify their 
existence. We believe that such findings feed into the normative debate about the merits 
of constitutional courts, and that they should be taken seriously both when deciding on 
the implementation of these institutions and when assessing the need for reforms in their 
design. 
 
The remainder of this article is as follows. In the next section we will present our 
theoretical framework and the hypothesis of this research. The following section presents 
the methods, data and operationalization used. Subsequently, we will present our analysis, 
accounting for the factors that explain public perceptions of national judiciaries in 26 
countries. The last section discusses these findings and their more general academic and 
political implications.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
   
 
II.                  Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
 
 
 
A. Constitutional courts and democracy 
 
 
Ginsburg and Versteeg GHILQHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOUHYLHZDVµWKHIRUPDOSRZHURI
a local court or court-like body to set aside or strike legislation for incompatibility with 
WKHQDWLRQDOFRQVWLWXWLRQ¶ Empirical research shows that the increase in the number of 
countries with systems of constitutional review has been a global trend for at least one 
century and a half, and that most world constitutions nowadays include this arrangement 
to some degree or another (Ginsburg and Versteeg, 2014: 590).  
 
Democratic countries take a diversity of approaches to the idea of constitutional review 
of legislation, but these can be roughly classified under four types (Ferreres Comella, 
2009: 4). Under V\VWHPV RI µSDUOLDPHQWDU\ VRYHUHLJQW\¶ QR FRXUW is allowed to annul 
legislation of the parliament, as the latter is deemed to be bestowed with the highest 
democratic legitimacy (Stone Sweet, 2002a:78). Although this approach has almost 
disappeared from Europe, it still persists in countries like the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands (Ferreres Comella, 2004: 462). Other countries follow the system of diffuse 
review, in which powers of constitutional review are attributed to the judicial branch in 
general. Third, many countries follow the Kelsenian model, in which one judicial-type 
institution monopolizes the power to declare legislation unconstitutional. While not the 
only one, the so-FDOOHG µ.HOVHQLDQ PRGHO¶ EHFDPH WKH PRVW common option in the 
European continent to judicially protect the normativity of the constitution (see Ferreres 
Comella, 2004: 462). In addition to this, some countries present models that exhibit traits 
of hybridity. Table 1 summarizes the approaches to constitutional review in the countries 
composing our sample. This article focuses on the effects on public perceptions of the 
justice system of Kelsenian constitutional courts strictly speaking, as opposed to all other 
approaches to judicial review. 
 
 
 
<Table 1 about here> 
 
So far, academic debates on constitutional review have been mostly theoretical and 
dominated by the triad rule of law-democracy-fundamental rights. For the defenders of 
constitutional courts, these institutions constitute the ultimate protection of these three 
values. According to the classic piece by Cappelletti and Adams (1965-1966: 1207) the 
spread of systems of constitutional review in post-war Europe was a result of the hope of 
FRQVWLWXWLRQDO IUDPHUV µWR HQVXUH WKH SUHVHUYDWLRQ LQ WKHLU FRXQWULHV RI D V\VWHP RI
government that would foster the growth RI OLEHUDO GHPRFUDF\¶ ,Q IDFW WKH IDWKHU RI
modern constitutional courts, Hans Kelsen (2015[1931]: 202), explicitly conceived of 
these institutions as a means to avoid descents towards totalitarianism in democratic 
societies. In protecting the constitution, constitutional courts would be the ultimate 
guarantee of the rule of law and democracy. Furthermore, while the original Kelsenian 
approach did not envisage enforcement of fundamental rights catalogues by constitutional 
   
 
   
 
courts, post-war constitutional courts almost universally afford such protection (Stone 
Sweet, 2002a: 81-82). 
 
Opponents of constitutional review also focus on the same concepts -rule of law, 
democracy, fundamental rights. According to them, when judicial institutions like 
constitutional courts declare the unconstitutionality of legislation, they contravene a basic 
democratic principle, because they contradict the will of the democratically legitimized 
legislature. For Jeremy Waldron (2µE\SULYLOHJLQJPDMRULW\YRWLQJDPRQJD
small number of unelected and unaccountable judges, [judicial review] disenfranchises 
RUGLQDU\FLWL]HQV¶,QWKHVDPHYHLQ0DUN7XVKQHW 154) argues for the suppression 
of judicial review in order WR µUHWXUQ DOO FRQVWLWXWLRQDO GHFLVLRQ-making to the people 
DFWLQJSROLWLFDOO\¶)LQDOO\LQ(XURSHZHKDYHDQH[FHOOHQWLQVWDQFHRIWKLVDSSURDFKLQ
the work of JAG Griffith. The British academic considered constitutional review as 
designed to produce conservative outcomes (Griffith, 1979: 17) and opposed it on the 
grounds that political decisions should be made by democratically accountable politicians 
(Griffith, 1979: 16). 
 
At the core of these debates lies the question whether institutions such as constitutional 
courts are more or less compatible with democratic systems of government. However, 
stimulating as they are, these debates have been so far carried out at a high level of 
theoretical abstraction. A focus on the empirical effects of constitutional courts has been 
missing in the discussion. For instance, whether constitutional courts are good or bad for 
democracy and the rule of law has a number of empirical dimensions that remain 
unexplored. One of them has to do with the effects of constitutional courts on public 
attitudes towards democratic institutions, and particularly towards the court system. This 
question is of the utmost relevance, as literature has put forward the importance of diffuse 
support for institutions for the long-term stability of democracies (Overby et al. 2004: 
159).  
 
(DVWRQGHILQHGGLIIXVHVXSSRUWIRULQVWLWXWLRQVDVDµUHVHUYRLURIIDYRXUDEOH
attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are 
RSSRVHG¶'LIIXVHVXSSRUWLVdifferent from specific support in that the latter is directed 
towards specific decisions, policies or actions of political authorities (Easton, 1975: 437). 
Diffuse support allows individuals to continue to back certain institutions even when such 
institutions make decisions that affect them negatively. From that perspective, it is easy 
to understand the importance of diffuse support for the survival of democratic institutions. 
In the case of the court system, literature suggests that the construction of diffuse support 
depends as a central element on perceptions of its neutrality and fairness (Cann and Yates 
2008: 304). In this article we scrutinize the impact that the presence of constitutional 
courts in a country has on those two aspects of public perceptions of the judiciary. Our 
aim is to provide normative debates on constitutional courts with evidence-based input 
that can help to improve the quality of discussion. 
 
 
 
B. Theorising the effects of constitutional courts on public perceptions of 
the court system 
 
 
   
 
   
 
As explained above, constitutional courts were created and are frequently justified as 
mechanisms of democracy protection. At the social level, however, we believe that the 
existence of constitutional courts in a jurisdiction has the potential to undermine public 
perceptions of the neutrality and fairness of the justice system. As said above, these two 
aspects are central to the construction of diffuse support for the judiciary, and therefore 
to the stability of democratic systems.  
 
Judicial neutrality is, in this article, FRQWUDSRVHGWRWKHLGHDµSROLWLFL]DWLRQ¶RIWKHMXGLFLDO
V\VWHP:HGHILQHµSROLWLFL]DWLRQ¶DVWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRULQWHQVLILFDWLRQRILGHRORJLFDORU
party-political logics in the design and process of decision-making of a judicial institution 
(see also Weiden, 2011). Neutrality can be defined as the expectation that judicial actors 
will take into account only abstract legal reasons in their decision-making, which are 
followed regardless of the specific characteristics of the litigants. While neutrality can be 
undermined by factors other than politicization, the latter is always at odds with judicial 
neutrality because it implies the existence of political considerations and biases in 
institutions that should take decisions following exclusively legal considerations. We find 
four reasons why the existence of a constitutional court in a country is likely to be 
associated with a general perception of the politicization of the judiciary.  
 
The first has to do with the appointment of the constitutional judges. In Kelsenian models 
constitutional review is concentrated in an institution whose members have been 
politically appointed in a very visible way (see Stone Sweet, 2002a: 88; Cappelletti and 
Adams, 1965-1966: 1219). From the outset, the Kelsenian model gave the prerogative to 
appoint constitutional judges to political actors, especially to the parliament, under the 
assumption that constitutional review of legislation was a quasi-legislative function 
(Kelsen, 1942: 188). Since constitutional judges are appointed to perform a de facto 
political function, it is not strange that political criteria underlie in appointments. This in 
itself can affect the image of neutrality of the court. And the problem is aggravated when, 
in connection to the system of appointments, political preferences guide judicial decision-
making (Hönnige, 2009; Hanretty, 2012), or at least if the public has that impression. 
Oppositely, this is less problematic in systems without constitutional review, or in 
systems in which this function is entrusted to an institution whose members are not 
politically appointed. 
 
The second factor, related to the former, has to do with the characteristics of constitutional 
judges. In models of diffuse review constitutional review is generally performed by life-
tenured career judges whose technocratic legitimacy is less questionable. Oppositely, 
constitutional judges in Kelsenian systems are appointed ad hoc to perform this function. 
Such systems often allow the appointment of other law professionals beyond career 
judges, and even sometimes politicians, often for fixed-terms that are sometimes 
renewable (see De Visser, 2014: 210-221). As a consequence, the perception that political 
(as opposed to technical-legal) considerations are part of the ethos of the institution will 
be stronger in the case of Kelsenian courts. 
 
Third, in Kelsenian models legislation can generally be reviewed a priori, in abstracto 
and with effects erga omnes by the court at the request of politicians (Stone Sweet, 2002a: 
87; Ferreres Comella, 2004: 463-464; De Visser, 2014: 96). This gives the constitutional 
court a very strong political power and renders very visible its participation in the political 
process. Precisely for their capacity tRµDFWXDOO\ VWULNHDSLHFHRIOHJLVODWLRQRXWRIWKH
statute-ERRNDOWRJHWKHU¶, Jeremy Waldron (2006: 1354) considers the Kelsenian model 
   
 
   
 
the strongest form of this arrangement. When a constitutional court uses this strong power 
to overturn legislation, in the context of the political traits of its institutional design 
analysed above, the image that emerges is that of a judicial actor striking down a decision 
of the democratically-elected legislator for political reasons.   
 
And fourth, there is the question of activism. As Lübbe-Wolff (2016: 25) puts it, in 
models of review by the judicial branch, courts will tend to be less expansive and activist 
than Kelsenian LQVWLWXWLRQVEHFDXVHµWKH\KDYHRWKHUILHOGVWRFXOWLYDWHDQGEXLOGXSRQLQ
a way that will make their work visible and gain a reputation¶. To all this we must add a 
characteristic of many countries based on review by the judicial branch in Europe, 
especially Scandinavian ones: the very low rate of declarations of unconstitutionality, 
based on a very strict approach to judicial restraint (Ferreres Comella, 2004: 462). The 
higher activism of constitutional courts makes the political aspects of institutional design 
and decision-making more noticeable. 
 
Each of these four points suggests that constitutional courts might be regarded by the 
public as judicial institutions that take political decisions, over political issues, for 
political reasons. In our view, this might lead to a perception of politicization of the 
institution. Since citizens associate constitutional courts with the court system in general 
this will have consequences for the judiciary as a whole, as public confidence in its 
neutrality will be undermined. For all these reasons, we expect that: 
 
 
H1. The existence of a Kelsenian constitutional court in a country is 
associated with higher public perception of the politicization of the 
judiciary 
 
Together with neutrality, the second aspect which is central to the construction of diffuse 
support for the judiciary is fairness. The idea of fairness can be defined, in connection to 
judicial actors, as the expectation that decisions will be just from a normative perspective: 
that they respond to abstract and general criteria of justice. We expect the existence of 
constitutional courts to be associated with a worse perception of fairness of the judicial 
system, for at least two reasons. 
The first is simply a consequence of the association between the existence of 
constitutional courts and perception of politicization of the judicial system, which was 
explained above. Usually, conceptions of fairness of judicial institutions rely heavily on 
the idea of neutrality and independence of courts (see Ferreres Comella, 2003-2004: 
 &RQVLGHU $OHF 6WRQH 6ZHHW¶V E WKHRU\ RI WULDGLF PRGHV RI GLVSXWH
resolution. For the author, agreement on a dispute resolver (such as a court) depends as a 
crucial first step on the recognition of her impartiality and wisdom (Stone Sweet, 2002b: 
62). In the absence of those characteristics, the parties in conflict will not agree to the 
delegation of the solution to their dispute to a third actor. 
Constitutional courts might then be detrimental to the image of fairness of the court 
system because they introduce partisan and political logics in the social perception of 
courts in a jurisdiction. Politicization of an institution like the constitutional court 
suggests that the most important judicial-type organ in a country does not decide 
independently from political pressures. The ideal of neutral judges capable of producing 
   
 
   
 
fair and unbiased decisions is in this scenario undermined. And with it, the social 
perception of the judicial system as a whole. 
There is a second reason why constitutional courts are expected to be associated with a 
ORZHU SHUFHSWLRQ RI WKH IDLUQHVV RI WKH MXGLFLDO V\VWHP 6WRQH 6ZHHW¶V WKHRU\ LV DOVR
relevant here. As said above, constitutional review by the constitutional court implies 
almost by definition that a judicial-type institution will enter the terrain of politics and 
will make decisions over politically sensitive issues. In so doing, the court will take sides 
in a politically contested issue, creating winners and losers, hence compromising its 
image of neutrality (Stone Sweet, 2002b: 155). For this reason, every constitutional 
review decision tends to alienate a part of the public, which will be prone to consider 
unfair a ruling that runs counter to their preferences. In fact, this is the case for any court 
ruling. But unlike decisions of ordinary courts, that only affect the parties to the dispute, 
constitutional courts¶ decisions are often taken in abstracto and erga omnes, affecting the 
polity as a whole. This will increase the number of political losers created by the decision, 
and therefore the number of citizens that consider the decision unfair. For this reason: 
 
 
H2. The existence of a Kelsenian constitutional court in a country is 
associated with a lower perception of fairness of justice 
 
 
C. Other factors affecting public perceptions on the court system 
 
A final theoretical point has to do with the additional individual-level and contextual 
factors that might affect public perceptions of the judicial system, and whose 
consideration is necessary in order to reliably test out hypotheses.  
To discard the possibility that our findings hide a relation between other macro level 
variables and public perceptions of the judiciary, we scrutinize two factors that are closely 
associated with the existence of Kelsenian institutions: the age of a democratic regime 
and the type of legal system, which were both included in previous studies in the field 
(Bühlmann and Kunz, 2011). Age of the democratic system is relevant because 
established democracies tend to have higher levels of institutional trust (McAllister, 1999; 
Bühlmann and Kunz, 2011: 324) and of confidence in judicial institutions (Gibson et al., 
1998; González-Ocantos, 2016), as support for judicial institutions increases over time. 
Furthermore, constitutional courts were often created in Europe in newly democratic 
countries that had exited long periods of authoritarian rule, while countries that have not 
experienced repressive regimes -and therefore have older democracies- are less likely to 
have these institutions. Something similar happens with the type of legal system. 
Empirical research shows that the type of legal system has effects on public confidence 
in the judiciary (Bühlmann and Kunz, 2011). At the same time, a simple look at the data 
shows that constitutional courts are more often associated with romanistic and 
germanistic civil law systems, and are less frequently implemented in Scandinavian legal 
systems or common law systems. The type of legal family and the age of democracy are 
therefore included in our analyses, in order to exclude the possibility of spurious 
associations between the existence of Kelsenian courts and public perceptions of the 
judiciary. 
   
 
   
 
Besides the age of democracy and type of legal system, we control for another macro-
level variable: the level of independence of lower courts. If lower courts are not 
independent, it is possible that the judicial system of the country will be perceived as 
politicized or unfair. And this, regardless of the system of constitutional review in that 
jurisdiction. 
 
Additionally, perceptions of the justice system may be related to variables that operate at 
the individual-level. General satisfaction with political institutions is one of them, as 
research has showed its association with satisfaction with the justice system (Bühlmann 
and Kunz, 2011; $\GÕQdDNÕUDQGùHNHUFLR÷OX). In order to avoid biases, we must 
consider the effects of individual satisfaction with politics, as those countries with lower 
levels of discontent with political institutions (most notably, Northern European 
countries) are often countries without constitutional courts.  
 
Research also suggests that political winners display a higher trust in the political system 
in general (Anderson and Tverdova, 2003; Singh et al., 2011; Singh et al., 2012) and there 
is also some evidence, albeit more limited, about a heightened trust in the justice system 
(Bühlmann and Kunz, 2011). In this way, those citizens whose preferred party is in 
government would be less prone to see the influence of politics in judicial decisions, as 
the politicization of the justice system is more likely to run in favour, rather than against, 
their preferences. In a similar manner, ideology and commitment to democratic values 
have also been tested as predictors of perceptions of the judiciary (Gibson, 2007; 
González-Ocantos, 2016). We expect those more ideologically radical -both left wing and 
right wing radicals- to display worse perceptions of the judicial system, given their 
preferences against the status-quo1.  
 
Finally, educational and economic levels are also important individual-level shapers of 
perceptions on the independence of the judiciary. Bühlmann and Kunz (2011) show that 
more educated individuals tend to have a greater confidence in the judicial system. 
Furthermore, literature in political science shows a general correlation between education 
and trust in political institutions (Anderson and Singer, 2008). Existing research also 
shows important evidence that economic winners tend to have a greater confidence in the 
judicial system (Bühlmann and Kunz, 2011). Since economic losers are more vulnerable 
vis-à-vis the judicial system, we expect that their perceptions of the judiciary will be more 
negative. 
 
 
 
III.                Data and Methods 
 
 
The focus of this paper lies on the effects of constitutional courts on the individual 
perception of independence and fairness of the judicial system. To test our hypotheses, 
we use individual data and take into account socio-demographic and political variables. 
For this reason, we use data from the 5th round of the European Social Survey (ESS, 2010) 
that includes a module with questions on public trust on justice. Alas, this module is not 
included in subsequent rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS) so our analysis is 
restricted to the year 2010 and 26 countries for which we were able to collect all the 
individual and macro-level data needed.  
 
   
 
   
 
As we are dealing with two different dimensions of attitudes towards justice, we have two 
independent variables. The first one is the perceived politicization of the judicial system. 
To measure this, we compute a simple dummy variable that takes value 1 when the 
respondent agrees strongly or siPSO\DJUHHVZLWKWKHVWDWHPHQWµThe decisions and actions 
of the courts are unduly influenced by pressure from poOLWLFDOSDUWLHVDQGSROLWLFLDQV¶, 
while it takes value 0 when s/he expresses some disagreement with the statement.2 Our 
second dependent variable, fairness of justice, is a continuous variable, ranging on a scale 
from 0 (never) to 10 (always) and measuring to what extent respondents think courts make 
fair and impartial decisions3. In taking into account these two dimensions of public 
perceptions of the court system, we use a strategy that allows a comprehensive 
understanding of cLWL]HQV¶YLHZVRIWKHjudiciary.  
 
As noted above, we want to know the ways in which opinions about the court system are 
shaped by their national context and, more specifically, by the existence of a 
constitutional court. Thus, our main explanatory variable is a dummy whose 
operationalization responds to what was shown in Table 1; countries with a constitutional 
court scored 1, while those without this institution scored 0. The other macro-level 
variables included in our analyses to test the robustness of the effect of having a 
constitutional court are the legal system, the age of democracy ±both presented in Table 
1-, and, as a control variable, the lower court independence. The legal system in the 
country is measured with a dummy variable that takes value 1 when it is the Romanic-
Germanic system, while it takes value 0 when the country belongs to the Scandinavian or 
common law legal family. The age of democracy is a continuous variable that measures 
the years of uninterrupted democratic regime in a country. For countries that follow a 
slow evolution towards democracy and do not suffer authoritarian regimes, it is difficult 
to determine when democracy exactly starts. For such countries, the value assigned in this 
variable is 100, the highest value in the distribution. For Germany, as the ESS does not 
differentiate between East and West, we consider for the age of democracy that of the 
Federal Republic of Germany. Finally, data on the extent to which lower courts are 
perceived as independent from the political power can be found in the V-DEM project 
dataset. This variable contains the relative country-year estimates of the extent to which 
judges in lower courts decide according to government wishes or, contrarily, their 
decisions are merely based on the law4. In this way, higher values are associated with a 
higher independence of lower courts, while negative scores imply these courts are more 
politicised5. 
 
Regarding the rest of the control variables, we analysed WKRVH DIIHFWLQJ LQGLYLGXDOV¶
perceptions on the judicial system. We include an additive index of confidence in politics 
built with the variables measuring trust in parliament, trust in politicians and trust in 
political parties. This index runs from 0 (no trust in politics at all) to 10 (complete trust 
in politics). Also, we are measuring ideological extremism as a scale running from 0 
(position 5 of the ideological scale) to 5 (positions 0 and 10 of the ideological scale, 
corresponding to extreme left and extreme right). Education is measured as an ordinal 
variable from 0 to 6 that corresponds to the levels of the International Standard 
Classification of Education (ISCED) running from less than lower secondary to higher 
tertiary education. Finally, we create dummy variables for economic losers and political 
winners. Economic losers are those that are in the two lower deciles of income in each 
country (i.e. the poorest 20 per cent). Political winners are those who voted for a party 
that became part of the government ruling the country during the time when the survey 
   
 
   
 
was done. In the case of coalitions, we consider political winners to include the voters of 
any of the parties that were part of the coalition government. 
 
Because of the hierarchical structure of the data (nested by country) and because it 
includes not only individual but also contextual variables, the most appropriate strategy 
is multilevel modelling. This strategy makes possible to avoid ecological and atomistic 
fallacies (Gelmann and Hill 2007)6. Thus, our basic multilevel model is as follows ሺ ?ሻ ௜ܻ௝ୀఉబೕାఉ೔ೕ௑೔ೕାఢ೔ೕ 
Where ݅= individuals and ݆= countries  
As we consider there are significant differences between countries, we include a random 
term for the intercept at the country level, what leads to the following final equation: ሺ ?ሻ ௜ܻ௝ୀఉబೕାఉ೔ೕ௑೔ೕା௨బೕାఢ೔ೕ 
More precisely, we ran multilevel logistic regressions (or generalized mixed-effect 
logistic regressions) for the models in which the dependent variable is the dichotomy of 
perceived politicization of justice with random intercepts by country. For the models on 
the fairness of justice, as our dependent variable is a scale from 0 to 10, we run linear 
mixed-effects models with random intercepts by country. 
 
IV.                Analysis 
 
 
Table 2 presents the results of the successive multilevel logistic regression models. The 
dependent variable here is the dummy measuring individual perceptions on the 
politicization of the judicial system. In the three different models estimated we include 
the main explanatory variable and successively the two other main macro variables, these 
are the legal system and the age of democracy7. Regarding the existence of constitutional 
courts, the results seem to support hypothesis 1: individuals living in a country with a 
constitutional court consider the judicial system to be more influenced by politics than 
citizens with equal individual characteristics living in countries without these institutions. 
This effect is stable even after including in the models the type of legal system and the 
age of democracy. From these other variables, only the age of democracy reaches levels 
of statistical significance, suggesting that the older the democracy, the more positive the 
perception of the independence of justice.  Also, in all three models the effect of lower 
court independence is positive and significant. This indicates that citizens are more likely 
to perceive justice as not influenced by politics when lower courts are more independent.  
However, the effect of this variable on the outcome is not as determining as that of having 
a constitutional court, meaning that even if we take the lowest score in our sample for this 
variable (-0.9), its impact on the perceived politicization of justice would be less relevant 
than that of having a constitutional court.  
As for individual predictors, these affect perceptions on the politicization of justice and 
their effect is the same in all three models8. Those more educated individuals, with a 
   
 
   
 
higher confidence in politics and whose voted party is in government, are more prone to 
see justice as independent from the pressures of politicians and political parties. The effect 
of being an economic loser is negative, pointing to the perception of a more politicized 
justice. However, it does not reach standard levels of statistical significance.  
<Table 2 about here> 
 
Regarding the goodness of fit of the models, it can be seen that model 3 -which 
includes both constitutional courts and age of democracy- has a better adjustment. In 
this model, the existence of a constitutional court decreases the probability of assessing 
justice as independent from politicians in about 15 per cent on a 95 per cent level of 
confidence. Additionally, it can be seen that when we do not consider the effect of the 
age of democracy the probability of perceiving justice as politicized is about 5 points 
higher with the same 95 per cent level of statistical significance.  
 
Taking all this into account, we decided to estimate the predicted probabilities of 
perceiving justice as politicized based on the democratic age of the country. As seen 
in Figure 1, there are clear differences between the perceived politicization of justice 
in countries with a constitutional court and those without it, the latter having a 
significant more positive view of the justice in the country. However, these differences 
decrease as democracies consolidate over time, to the point that in old democracies 
(those that experience democracy for more than 83 years) having a constitutional court 
would not affect perceptions on the independence of the judiciary. 
 
<Figure 1 about here> 
 
Taken together, we can conclude that hypothesis 1 is partially confirmed as having a 
constitutional court in the country has a negative impact on individual perceptions of 
citizens, although the justice system is seen as more independent from politics the 
more consolidated is a democracy. 
 
The other dimension of justice that we analyze is its perceived fairness. We again ran 
three models with the same independent variables previously used, just changing the 
dependent variable and using a multilevel linear regression instead of a logistic one. 
As seen in Table 3, the results are similar. With regards to the individual-level 
variables, the only significant change is that being a political winner loses its 
relevance, while the effect of being an economic loser becomes more meaningful. In 
this way, those that are among the poorest 20 per cent in a society tend to see justice 
as more unfair than those with a more prosperous economic situation.  
 
 
   
<Table 3 about here> 
 
Regarding our macro-level variables, again, having a constitutional court has a negative 
effect on perceptions of justice. As seen in Figure 2, views on justice are significantly 
more positive if there is no constitutional court in the country. Differences among groups 
of countries can reach more than 0.6 points, meaning that individuals with the same 
characteristics in countries with the same legal system and democratic experience can 
   
 
   
 
perceive justice in their country if it has a constitutional court about half a point more 
unfair on a scale from 0 to 10 than in a country without a constitutional court. 
 
<Figure 2 about here> 
 
This finding that would support our expectations summed up in hypothesis 2. In order to 
confirm it, we plot the predicted values of the variable of constitutional courts over the 
age of the democratic experience in the country (see Figure 3). As it was the case with 
the perceived politicization of justice, the age of a democracy not only affects perceptions, 
but also moderates the effect of having a constitutional court. However, its effects are not 
linear. In very young democracies, there are no significant differences between the 
perceptions on the fairness of justice of individuals in countries with and without a 
constitutional court. This is also the case when the democratic experience is reaching 80 
years. In those cases, there are no significant differences based on having a constitutional 
court or not; however, it can be seen that the older the democracy, the more dispersed the 
perceptions on the fairness of justice in the case of countries with a constitutional court. 
Only during the central years in which the regime is being consolidated can significant 
differences between the two groups be observed. 
 
<Figure 3 about here> 
 
Taken together, both hypotheses 1 and 2 can be partially confirmed as we have seen that 
constitutional courts have negative effects on both the perceived politicization and 
fairness of justice, but this changes with the age of democracy. In short, it can be said that 
the older a democracy is, the more its citizens assess its justice as fair and independent 
from politics. This finding implies that the negative perceptions of the judiciary are no 
longer affected by having a constitutional court when the country has close to eight 
decades of democratic experience. We are aware that these results are heavily influenced 
by the three cases coded with 100 years of democratic experience; however when these 
cases are not considered, the differences between countries with and without 
constitutional court remain statistically significant9.  
 
 
V.                  Conclusion 
 
 
In our research we found evidence that the existence of a constitutional court in a country 
is associated with more negative perceptions of the independence and fairness of the court 
system, which are central elements in the construction of diffuse support for judicial 
institutions. For this reason, we believe that this article makes an important contribution 
to the theoretical debate about the merits of constitutional courts. As suggested by 
Bühlmann and Kunz (2011: 318), low levels of public confidence in the judiciary can 
cause important problems for a democracy, since it reduces the political capital that 
judicial organs need to control the political branches of government. If that is true, we 
must conclude that our results show that, paradoxically, constitutional courts often have 
detrimental effects to the very aims that justify their existence: the stabilization and 
protection of democratic societies. This said, our conclusions need to be interpreted with 
two important caveats in mind. 
 
   
 
   
 
The first is that the effect of these institutions on public confidence in the judiciary is not 
the only measure of their success. Constitutional court sceptics may consider that our 
findings strengthen their stance in the theoretical debate. But constitutional courts were 
created primarily with the aim of protecting democracy and human rights, often in 
countries that had experienced authoritarian regimes (see Ferejohn, 2002: 51). In 
normative terms, the detrimental effects of constitutional courts on public perceptions on 
the court system must be balanced against their potential contribution to the preservation 
of democracy and the improvement of human rights protection in a country. In this regard, 
more empirically-oriented research to substantiate these claims about the capacity of 
constitutional courts to protect democracy is needed.  
 
Secondly, to the relief of constitutional court apologists, we have shown that the negative 
effects of these institutions tend to diminish the older a democracy is. This, somehow, 
supports the argument that public perceptions of justice are not completely independent 
from those of politics. These findings however must be taken with a grain of salt. First, 
we know that many of the oldest democracies do not have constitutional courts meaning 
that countries with and without constitutional court are not equally distributed in what 
respects the age of their democratic regimes. This is a limitation that, so far, cannot be 
overcome as only time can change this situation. Secondly, we are aware that our analysis 
represents a static picture as we could only test our hypotheses for the year 2010. Thus, 
this research would benefit from more data that could help to understand the process by 
which democratic consolidation might attenuate the negative effects of constitutional 
courts on public perceptions on the judiciary. For this it is necessary to emphasize how 
attitudes towards politics and towards the political system affect perceptions on the court 
system and further research could benefit if more questions about the assessment of the 
judiciary are included in political surveys. We hope that our contribution will help in this 
endeavour. 
 
Notes 
1
 Jost et al. (2007) found out that moderate ideology was associated with avoidance of 
uncertainty. Thus, those with moderate ideological would rather choose status quo against 
radical change of the system.  
2
 Despite the ordinal distribution of the original variable, we decided to combine 
categories and create a binomial distribution. 
3
 Description of the variables can be found in the appendix table A.1. 
4
 6FRUHV DUH FDOFXODWHG IURP WKH FRXQWU\ H[SHUWV¶ DQVZHUV WR WKH IROORZLQJ TXHVWLRQ
³:KHQMXGJHVnot on the high court are ruling in cases that are salient to the government, 
how often would you say that their decisions merely reflect government wishes regardless 
RI WKHLU VLQFHUH YLHZ RI WKH OHJDO UHFRUG"´ 
5
 To know more about the methodology of the V-DEM Project and the details of relative 
scales as the one used here, see Coppedge et al. 2018:29. 
6A possible alternative would have been group-level regressions on country averages. The 
problem with using average individual factors is that we cannot predict individual 
outcomes. As an example, a median average of confidence in political institutions can be 
the result of a mostly moderately satisfied citizenship or the consequence of very 
polarized positions towards them. 
   
 
   
 
7
 The low number of cases at the superior level and the multicollinearity of constitutional 
courts, age of democracy and legal system discouraged us to include a model in which all 
three contextual variables were included at the same time.  
8
 See empty models in the appendix tables A.2 and A.3. 
9
 See models without the oldest democracies in tables A.4 and A.5 in the appendix. 
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